CRAFTING FEE-SHIFTING POLICY
Benjamin P. Edwards *
ABSTRACT
The controversy over emerging fee-shifting corporate bylaw and charter provisions
presents multiple policy choices. Delaware’s decision to ban the provisions offers an
opportunity for: (i) states to offer a meaningful alternative to Delaware; and (ii) the
generation of useful information for evaluating whether particular bylaws or charter
provisions enhance shareholder wealth.
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INTRODUCTION
Scholars often characterize Delaware as having won a competition
over gathering the most state corporate charters.1 With the victory came
spoils. One recent estimate projected that Delaware would collect almost
a billion dollars in 2018 from corporate charter and other business entity
fees.2 These revenues provide significant financial support for state
operations, but they do not establish that Delaware got everything right.
Observers explain Delaware’s dominance with different theories.
Some contend that Delaware enjoys a massive network effect and its
dominance continues simply because there are benefits to joining the
larger corporate paradigm—even when the law might not be optimal for
a corporation.3 Others argue that Delaware maintains its dominance
because it offers access to high-quality Chancery courts, specialized in
resolving business disputes.4 Many believe that states decide against
challenging Delaware because Delaware could always simply amend its
laws to copy any innovation delivered by a successful challenger.5
Despite its current dominance, Delaware’s place may be more
See J. Haskell Murray, The Social Enterprise Law Market, 75 MD. L. REV. 541, 567 (2016)
(“professors Bruce Kobayashi and Larry Ribstein concluded that Delaware has won the
competition for LLCs for many of the same reasons Delaware has won the competition
for corporate charters, and that most other states seem more interested in retaining local
LLCs than fighting for LLCs from outside their state”).

1

See Financial Overview, Delaware, https://budget.delaware.gov/budget/fy2018/
documents/operating/financial-overview.pdf (“DEFAC estimates (after refunds) for
these categories are $975.0 million for Fiscal Year 2017 and $992.6 million for Fiscal Year
2018”).

2

See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L.
REV. 757, 852 (1995) (“Second, the possibility that network externalities are significant
in the corporate charter market implies that the products produced in that market may
be suboptimal. Delaware’s dominance may have resulted in too much uniformity in state
laws.”).

3

See Lynn M. LoPucki, Corporate Charter Competition, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2101, 2102–03
(2018) (“Delaware’s competitive strategy is principally judicial, not legislative. . .
Delaware Chancery Court has struggled to attract cases and, as a result, some believe
that Delaware’s strategy has begun to unravel”).

4

See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering
the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 557 (2002) (“even if a rival were
to identify some substantial set of changes that could significantly benefit both
shareholders and management, . . . [t]he substantial amount of time that would be
required for the challenger to adopt changes and for firms to respond to them would
provide Delaware with ample opportunity to react.”).

5
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precarious than many recognize.6 In particular, Delaware’s vaunted
judiciary may wield less influence now than in years past because many
shareholder plaintiffs have begun filing suits outside Delaware for
strategic reasons.7 Delaware may also be less nimble in its responses to
rival states for two reasons: (i) significant changes in Delaware law may
draw federal intervention, limiting Delaware’s ability to swiftly respond;8
and (ii) powerful interest groups within Delaware, namely Delaware
lawyers that benefit from corporate litigation, may block changes that
affect their interests and reduce litigation.9
Given the strategic terrain, state corporate law may soon diverge
from Delaware on important issues.
Most notably, Delaware’s
controversial decision to ban most fee-shifting bylaws and charter
provisions provides an ideal opening.10 After the Delaware Supreme
Court approved the use of a fee-shifting bylaw for a non-stock
corporation in ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund. (ATP), many stock
6

LoPucki, supra note 4, at 2103.

7

Id.

See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 600 (2003) (“Federal
chartering is the most obvious means of preempting state corporate law. But even were
there no prospect of federal chartering--as is the situation today-- federal authorities
could still make corporate law, as they indeed do. In doing so, they deeply affect the
state-to-state race”).
8

9 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Fee-Shifting: Delaware’s Self-Inflicted Wound, 40 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 851, 873 (2016) (“The basic problem was that S.B. 75 presented an unprecedented
conflict between the interests of the State and those of Delaware lawyers, the interest
group that dominates corporate lawmaking in Delaware”); Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware,
Lawyers, and Contractual Choice of Law, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 999, 1009–10 (1994) (“Delaware
lawyers, in essence, are the Delaware legislature, at least insofar as corporate law is
concerned.” “[L]egislators are likely to rely on lawyers to supply sophisticated
commercial and business legislation. As a result, virtually all of Delaware corporate law
is proposed by the Delaware bar, and the bar’s proposals invariably pass through the
legislature”).
10 Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 871 (explaining that the ban “is especially likely to trigger
a migration away from Delaware because it is one of those rare corporate law changes
that directly affects the potential personal liability of corporate officers and directors”);
John C. Coffee, Jr., Fee-Shifting and the SEC: Does It Still Believe in Private Enforcement?, CLS
BLUE SKY BLOG (Oct. 14, 2014), archived at https://perma.cc/QD6P-N9TX (“[T]he
permissibility of automatic fee-shifting is a major difference that will fuel
interjurisdictional competition because it protects corporate managers and directors
from potential personal liability”).
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corporations adopted similar provisions as part of their corporate bylaws
or charters.11 Corporations began adopting these provisions as a response
to increased litigation around mergers and acquisitions transactions.12
Within about a year and over howls of protest, the Delaware legislature
banned most fee-shifting provisions at the prompting of the Delaware
state bar.13 Because fee-shifting provisions threatened to reduce corporate
litigation volume, Delaware’s corporate lawyers had significant, selfinterested reasons to support the ban.14
Many, possibly pretextual, arguments over fee-shifting provisions
claimed that the provisions would be good or bad for shareholders.
Opponents argued that fee-shifting provisions would hurt shareholders
because management would use them to insulate themselves from
challenge. In this entrenchment narrative, unfaithful managers would loot
corporate assets while secure in the knowledge that few plaintiffs would
sue. A fee-shifting provision would chill meritorious litigation because
few shareholders would voluntarily expose themselves to liability for
staggering corporate litigation fees. Presumably, corporations with such
provisions would be worth less to shareholders because they would have
less freedom to challenge management and a greater expectation that
management would steal. Moreover, rational shareholders holding these
views would sell on the news that a corporation adopted a fee-shifting
provision. Supporters, on the other hand, argued that the provisions
responded to value-destroying shareholder litigation, benefiting
shareholders by reducing litigation costs and making more money
available for investment or dividends. In theory, rational investors
concerned about excessive litigation costs would prefer to buy shares in a
company likely to have lower litigation expenses.
These questions need not go unanswered. A state could pass
legislation designed to attract corporate incorporations and
simultaneously gather information useful for further amending and
promoting its corporate law. Access to favored governance innovations
may draw public corporations to reincorporate or announce the
ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 555 (Del. 2014) (“we hold
that fee-shifting provisions in a non-stock corporation’s bylaws can be valid and
enforceable under Delaware law”).

11

See Albert H. Choi, Fee-Shifting and Shareholder Litigation, 104 VA. L. REV. 59, 62 (2018)
(“generated a substantial amount of controversy, but a number of corporations
promptly took advantage of this newly validated right”).

12

13

See Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 853–54.

Even transactional lawyers might support a ban because litigation risk often drives the
decision to invest in expensive transactional processes.

14
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enactment of fee-shifting provisions, opening the door for market
reactions to provide useful information about the provisions’ impact. If
stocks tended to fall on these announcements, a state might conclude that
the provisions destroyed wealth and harmed shareholders. This evidence
would support following Delaware and banning the provisions. On the
other hand, if stocks reliably rise when corporations announce or propose
these changes, the experiment would indicate that the state’s law generated
wealth for shareholders. This result might accelerate any shift in market
share toward a state endorsing fee-shifting provisions because it would
make a corporation more valuable.
In any event, some corporations chartered outside of Delaware
will continue to adopt fee-shifting provisions until judicial decisions or
legislation invalidate the governance rule. Indeed, a good number of
corporations chartered outside of Delaware have already done so despite
the uncertainty around whether courts will enforce these provisions.
Legislation offers a way to thoughtfully shape how these provisions
emerge instead of leaving the decision entirely to corporate managers and
courts.
Ultimately, state competition on this front seems inevitable simply
because of potential revenues available from even small inroads into
Delaware’s near billion-dollar revenue stream. Despite past lassitude,
some states have launched challenges attempting to capture increased
incorporation market share.15 Notably, Nevada began to compete more
aggressively in the market for corporate incorporations when it raised it
taxes on corporate charters in 2003.16 Although Nevada has not yet
captured sizeable market share, it has had some success in drawing outof-state incorporations, ranking a distant second behind Delaware.17
15 See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 5, at 555 (“the alleged vigorous race among states
vying for incorporations, we argue, simply does not exist. We present evidence that
Delaware’s dominant position is far stronger, and thus that the competitive threat that it
faces is far weaker, than has been previously recognized.”).
16 See Michal Barzuza, Market Segmentation: The Rise of Nevada as a Liability-Free Jurisdiction,
98 VA. L. REV. 935, 940 (2012) (“Nevada has capitalized on this opportunity by offering,
and aggressively marketing, a unique product—a no-liability corporate law—that has
proven attractive to a subset of American companies.”).
17 LoPucki, supra note 4, at 2112 (“Compustat data on 7061 public-company
incorporations show that, as compared with a hypothetical regulatory scheme that would
require companies to incorporate in their headquarters states, Delaware gains 3879
corporations (fifty-five percent of the 7061). Only four other states gain at all. Nevada
gains 282 corporations (four percent)”).
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This essay suggests an intermediate path for states overseeing
emerging fee-shifting provisions. The public securities markets produce
valuable information useful for evaluating the significance of new
information. States should move to deliberately harness the market’s
information-generating power as they revise their corporate laws. If wellexecuted, the end result would be more efficient corporate law rules and
greater prosperity.
This essay proceeds in three short parts. Part I provides a brief
discussion of the nature of corporate law and its goals. Part II discusses
the controversy over fee-shifting provisions as an ideal opportunity for
thoughtful exploration. Part III discusses mechanisms for legislation to
harness the market’s information-generating power.
I.

THE GOALS OF CORPORATE LAW

A robust, long-running debate over corporate law’s purpose
continues between scholars.18 Although a universally accepted consensus
will likely never emerge, some common and widely held views about the
purposes served by corporate law suggest metrics for evaluating and
considerations for crafting new corporate law.19 This Part briefly reviews
a few, but not all, common positions.
A. Coordinated Activity and Wealth Creation
Many view corporate law’s chief and least controversial purpose
as creating social wealth by facilitating economic investment and
development. One scholar framed the view as “corporate law should
See, e.g., E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L.
REV. 1145, 1154 (1932) (“My conception of it is this: That there are three groups of
people who have an interest in that institution. One is the group of fifty-odd thousand
people who have put their capital in the company, namely, its stockholders. Another is
a group of well toward one hundred thousand people who are putting their labor and
their lives into the business of the company. The third group is of customers and the
general public.”); Lyman Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business Judgment
Rule, Corporate Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 435 (2013) (“Beyond positive law and
theory addressing corporate purpose, the normative debate has gone on for decades and
shows no signs of abating”); Virginia Harper Ho, “Enlightened Shareholder Value”: Corporate
Governance Beyond the Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, 36 J. CORP. L. 59, 71 (2010) (“Over the
course of the past century, the famous debate between Adolph Berle and Merrick Dodd
in the Harvard Law Review over the nature and purpose of the corporation has been
traced and retraced in a pendulum swing between two fundamental positions.”).

18

See Tamara Belinfanti & Lynn Stout, Contested Visions: The Value of Systems Theory for
Corporate Law, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 606 (2018) (“Multiple purposes are the rule, not
the exception, in systems. Indeed, it is hard to think of any designed system whose
designer would not have had more than one goal in mind”).

19
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facilitate corporate attempts to maximize productive output (and hence
wealth) in a competitive economy, encouraging long-term investment at
the lowest cost of capital, subject to exterior regulations that control
externalities.”20 Notably, this view does not mean that corporations
should focus on creating wealth exclusively for shareholders or that the
wealth generated should be distributed in any particular way.21
This view remains consistent with the influential team production
model for corporate law.22 Under this view, corporate directors serve the
interests of the corporation, understood as the interests of the
corporation’s diverse stakeholders that have made investments of some
kind in the corporation, and not purely the interests of the corporation’s
shareholders.23 It accepts that although shareholders have special rights
in some circumstances, corporate law insulates directors from direct
shareholder control.24

20

William W. Bratton, Framing A Purpose for Corporate Law, 39 J. CORP. L. 713, 723 (2014).

21 Id. at 720 (“There is no place for shareholder primacy in a statement of the corporate
purpose that aspires to general acceptance. The shareholder maximization norm follows
from a particular conception of the optimal incentive alignment within the firm, a
conception contestable in theory”).
22 See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85
VA. L. REV. 247, 285 (1999) (“The mediating hierarchy model consequently suggests that
the public corporation can be viewed most usefully not as a nexus of implicit and explicit
contracts, but as a nexus of firm-specific investments made by many and varied
individuals who give up control over those resources to a [decision-making] process in
hopes of sharing in the benefits that can flow from team production”).
23 Id. at 288 (“Corporate law does not treat directors as shareholders’ agents but as
something quite different: independent hierarchs who are charged not with serving
shareholders’ interests alone, but with serving the interests of the legal entity known as
the “corporation.” The interests of the corporation, in turn, can be understood as a
joint welfare function of all the individuals who make firm-specific investments and
agree to participate in the extracontractual, internal mediation process within the firm.”).

Id. at 288–89 (“we argue that public corporation law encourages directors to serve the
joint interests of all stakeholders who comprise the corporate “team” by generally
insulating them from the demands of any single stakeholder group, including the
shareholders.” “Shareholders enjoy special legal rights not because they have some
unique claim on directors, but because they often are in the best position to represent
the interests of the coalition that comprises the firm.”).
24
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B. Shareholder Wealth Maximization
Although not universally accepted, the most widely-taught
corporate law norm and conventional wisdom is that corporate law and
corporations both serve to maximize shareholder wealth.25 This means
that a corporation’s board of directors should generally act in good faith
to maximize shareholder wealth.26 This view holds that:
[U]ltimate control over the corporation should rest with
the shareholder class; the managers of the corporation
should be charged with the obligation to manage the
corporation in the interests of its shareholders; other
corporate constituencies, such as creditors, employees,
suppliers, and customers, should have their interests
protected by contractual and regulatory means rather than
through participation in corporate governance;
noncontrolling shareholders should receive strong
protection from exploitation at the hands of controlling
shareholders; and the market value of the publicly traded
corporation's shares is the principal measure of its
shareholders' interests. 27
Much of the shareholder primacy framework draws from an
agency model of corporate law. In this model, the shareholders are the
principals in the relationship and the corporation’s directors, officers, and
employees all serve as agents. A corporation’s stock price provides a
constant referendum on agent performance.28 Embracing stock price
Lynn A. Stout, On the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, Signs of Its Fall, and the Return of
Managerialism (in the Closet), 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1169, 1177 (2013) (“[C]ombined
enthusiasm for shareholder primacy ideology among academics, hedge funds, policy
entrepreneurs, executives, and journalists, goes a long way toward explaining how
shareholder primacy managed so swiftly to mature from provocative academic theory to
conventional wisdom.”).

25

See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea That For-Profit Corporations Seek
Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 155 (2012) (“[C]orporate law requires directors, as
a matter of their duty of loyalty, to pursue a good faith strategy to maximize profits for
the stockholders.”).

26

Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO.
L.J. 439, 440–41 (2001).

27

Lynn A. Stout, supra note 25, at 1177 (“[S]hareholder primacy ideology led to a number
of individually modest but collectively significant changes in corporate law and practice
that had the practical effect of driving directors and executives in public corporations to
focus on share price as their guiding star.”).

28
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reactions as a metric to measure corporate law itself may link corporate
law more closely to shareholder wealth maximization.
Of course, many states now explicitly authorize directors to
consider other interests with constituency statutes. For example, Nevada’s
statute allows a corporate board to consider a variety of constituencies,
including the “interests of the corporation's employees, suppliers,
creditors or customers” as well as the community’s interest, the State or
Nation’s interest, and the short-term or long-term interests of
shareholders.29
C. Private Ordering and Transaction Cost Reduction
Corporate law also serves to provide default rules and reduce
transaction costs for persons forming corporate entities.30 In the
contractarian view, corporate law should provide the sorts of default rules
that stakeholders would have arrived at if they had bargained over how to
structure the terms of their relationships.31 Outside of the default rules,
contractarians expect managers and shareholders to arrive at deals that
maximize the value of corporate entities and tend to defer to the parties’
choices.32 Some believe that market pressure will encourage corporations
to enact governance provisions that maximize firm value.33
29

Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 78.138 (West 2017).

30 See William T. Allen, Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1395, 1400 (1993) (“Corporate law is seen as a way to provide a standard set of
instructions for the operation of such a governance structure. In the corporate charter
much of this standard set can be replaced by terms better suited to the perceived needs
of the parties involved, if that is efficient and desired, but the cheaper, “off-the-rack”
terms set forth in the corporate statute will often serve well enough.”).
31 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 15 (1991) (“The normative thesis of the book is that corporate law
should contain the terms people would have negotiated, were the costs of negotiating at
arm’s length for every contingency sufficiently low. The positive thesis is that corporate
law almost always conforms to this model.”).
32 Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 65 STAN. L. REV.
1325, 1328 (2013) (“The contractarian theory brought economics into the analysis of
corporate governance and corporate law, and in doing so it provided a fresh start based
on simple assumptions and straightforward economic logic. In the absence of
transaction costs, economic theory implies that managers will customize the terms of
their relationship with shareholders to maximize firm value.”).
33 See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L.
REV. 757, 767 (1995) (“In the contractarian paradigm, firm managers are conceptualized
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D. State Revenue
Corporate law also serves the interests of the state by providing
franchise taxes, fees, and increased economic activity. States may make
changes to their corporate law or supporting infrastructure with this
financial objective in mind.34
Notably, investor interests and the threat of federal intervention
theoretically constrain state competition.35 For example, if a state offered
one-sided terms favoring corporate managers over investors, corporations
organized under the law of that state would, in theory, attract fewer
investors.
II.

EMERGING FEE-SHIFTING PROVISIONS

Delaware’s decision to ban fee-shifting corporate bylaws and
charter provisions provides a rare opportunity for states to offer an
attractive alternative to Delaware because Delaware’s legislature stripped
the freedom to adopt fee-shifting provisions from Delaware corporate
law. This part briefly traces that controversy and overviews recent
research.
A. Corporate Litigation Expands Beyond the Realm of Reason
For some time, deal litigation has increased, driving significant
costs for shareholders.36 One relatively recent study found that as of
2013, “97.5% of deals over $100 million were challenged through
litigation, and each transaction triggered an average of seven separate
lawsuits.”37 It seems unlikely that corporate malfeasance in merger deals
as selecting a set of charter terms that capital markets price and that investors, in effect,
purchase when they purchase a firm’s securities. Because they have incentives to obtain
the highest value for their firm’s shares, managers attempt to offer terms that maximize
share values by minimizing agency costs and signaling to investors valuable information
about the firm.”).
For example, a state might invest in improved customer service by appropriating
additional funding for the state agency charged with administering ministerial corporate
law.

34

See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The “Race to the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on Recent
Developments in Delaware’s Corporate Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913, 919–20 (1982) (claiming
that Delaware “has achieved its prominent position because its permissive corporation
law maximizes, rather than minimizes, shareholders’ welfare.”).

35

See Jill E. Fisch et. al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical
Analysis and A Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557, 558 (2015) (“[T]he frequency of
merger litigation has risen sharply over the last several years.”).

36

37

Id. at 559 (citing Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Takeover Litigation in 2013
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has become so widespread as to justify this volume of litigation.38
Much securities and derivative litigation suffers from an agency
cost problem. In essence, plaintiffs’ counsel face a continual economic
incentive to press securities and derivative litigation when litigation
remains profitable for their firms—even if overly aggressive private
enforcement reduces shareholder welfare.39 In many instances, plaintiffs’
counsel have received hundreds of thousands in fees paid by the
corporation while the shareholder class receives mere additional
disclosure about the deal.40
The disclosure-settlement problem may even weaken incentives
to actually deal with conflicts when putting deals together. Leading
academic experts have critiqued the litigation in strong terms:
At the root of the crisis in shareholder litigation is the
absence of meaningful incentives on either side to protect
shareholder rights. Plaintiffs' lawyers seeking disclosure
settlements happily trade litigation rights into which they
have invested little, if any, real investigative effort.
Meanwhile, defense counsel, who also collect fees
ultimately funded by shareholders, set up the settlements
that result in the abandonment of shareholder rights. The
disclosure settlement dynamic may also lead defense
counsel to take a more cavalier approach to potentially

1-2 & tbl. A (Moritz Coll. of Law Ctr. for Interdisciplinary Law & Policy Studies, Pub.
Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series No. 236, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2377001 [http://perma.cc/XP2B-8C8B]).
See Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 861 (reviewing evidence “suggesting that the pervasive
problem in this area is not breaches of duty by directors and officers but rather strike
suits filed by the plaintiffs’ bar.”).
38

See Benjamin P. Edwards, Disaggregated Classes, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 305, 319 (2015)
(“Agency cost problems may also drive over-enforcement of the securities laws. Overenforcement issues arise when the plaintiffs’ counsel would litigate to secure fees and
payment even though the litigation would not be in the plaintiffs’ long-term interest.”).
39

40 Courts now recognize that these disclosure-only settlements provide, at best, dubious
value to shareholders. See Matthew D. Cain et. al., The Shifting Tides of Merger Litigation,
71 VAND. L. REV. 603, 605 (2018) (“In several decisions, judges openly questioned the
value of so-called disclosure-only merger litigation settlements in which the only relief
provided to the plaintiff class was additional disclosure by the takeover parties.”).
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serious conflicts or other complications.41
Delaware’s Chancery courts now recognize that they have
struggled to control the litigation, with one leading jurist opining that
Delaware courts’ history of approving “disclosure settlements of
marginal value [to shareholders] and to routinely grant broad releases to
defendants and six-figure fees to plaintiffs' counsel . . . caused deal
litigation to explode in the United States beyond the realm of reason.”42
Excessive deal litigation also has broader consequences. The
excessive securities and derivative litigation has also been linked to
concerns about the competitiveness of American capital markets.43 The
Supreme Court echoed this concern in Stoneridge Investment Partners v.
Scientific Atlanta when it decided against expanding Rule 10b-5 liability.44
In essence, firms considering whether to offer their securities to the public
may shy away from American capital markets if the litigation environment
will interfere with their operations and create additional costs.
Investors have good reasons to be skeptical about securities
litigation. For many shareholders, securities litigation may be value
destroying.45 To attract quality directors, corporations must purchase
insurance to protect the directors from personal liability—otherwise, few
directors would be willing to serve. When shareholder litigation settles,
the funds for defense costs and plaintiffs’ fees often come from either the
corporation or the insurance policy. If the funds come from the
corporation, those funds cannot be paid out in dividends or reinvested
into economic activities. If the funds come from insurance policies,
insurance companies react by charging corporations larger premiums for
insurance. In either instance, shareholders make less money.

Dan Awrey et. al., Resolving the Crisis in U.S. Merger Regulation: A Transatlantic Alternative
to the Perpetual Litigation Machine, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 14 (2018).

41

42

In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 894 (Del. Ch. 2016).

See Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 865–66 (reviewing evidence that excessive shareholder
litigation creates “a substantial drag on the economy as a whole”).

43

Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Sci.-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 164 (2008) (“Overseas firms
with no other exposure to our securities laws could be deterred from doing business
here . . . . This, in turn, may raise the cost of being a publicly traded company under our
law and shift securities offerings away from domestic capital markets.” (internal citation
omitted)).

44

See Edwards, supra note 39, at 317 (“[M]ost compensation paid [in securities litigation]
is essentially circular and wasteful.”).

45

2019]

CRAFTING FEE-SHIFTING POLICY

945

B. The Delaware Controversy
Against the backdrop of expanding shareholder litigation, the
Delaware Supreme Court decided ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund.46
The case upheld a controversial bylaw provision that allowed ATP Tour
to shift its litigation costs to the plaintiff if the plaintiff did not succeed
on substantially all claims pressed in its litigation.47 The decision signaled
that the Delaware Supreme Court might approve private attempts to alter
the attorney-fee regime for shareholder derivative litigation.
Notably, shareholder derivative litigation already has a unique fee
structure. In most litigation under the “American Rule,” each party bears
its own fees and costs regardless of the outcome.48 This differs from the
English Rule, where the loser pays the winner’s legal fees. Shareholder
litigation proceeds a bit differently because the corporation normally pays
the fees for the successful plaintiff ’s lawyers under the common benefit
doctrine after a settlement resolving the litigation is approved.49
This dynamic generates multiple consequences. Attorneys may
take cases from shareholders with small individual recoveries if they will
be able to receive fees for a benefit, even a benefit of dubious value, that
is conferred on all shareholders. This creates an incentive to represent
dispersed shareholders and gives shareholders a meaningful way to protect
their rights. On the downside, the possibility of lush attorney fees for
disclosure-only settlements seemingly motivates litigation profitable to
the attorney, even if it is not necessarily in the best interest of
shareholders.
Controversy erupted in 2014 as some ordinary Delaware
corporations quickly began to adopt fee-shifting provisions as a means to
46 ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 555 (Del. 2014) (“[W]e hold
that fee-shifting provisions in a non-stock corporation’s bylaws can be valid and
enforceable under Delaware law.”).
47

Id.

48 Id. at 558 (“Delaware follows the American Rule, under which parties to litigation
generally must pay their own attorneys’ fees and costs.”).
49 See Sean J. Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder Litigation by Shifting
the Doctrine on Fees, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1, 37–38 (2015) (“In spite of famously declining to
follow English doctrine on fee-shifting, American courts did adopt the practice of
English courts of equity in ordering the sharing of fees among all beneficiaries of a fund
recovered for the ‘common benefit.” (citation omitted)).
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deter litigation.50 Plaintiffs’ lawyers lobbied the legislature to ban feeshifting provisions, and the legislature delayed action after the business
community protested.51
The debate over fee-shifting provisions for intercorporate
litigation has significant implications for shareholders, corporate
managers, and attorneys. On the self-interested front, some attorneys
may oppose it because it will reduce the profitability and demand for legal
services.52 Corporate managers and directors may favor it simply because
it may reduce their exposure to litigation. These personal stakes may color
how many evaluate fee-shifting provisions.
Personal stakes to the side, proponents and opponents framed
their arguments in terms of shareholder and public interests. Opponents
argued that fee-shifting provisions would unduly insulate management
and allow them to self-deal and take advantage of shareholders too afraid
to litigate for fear of crushing attorney’s fees.53 They also argued that by
reducing intra-corporate litigation volume, fee-shifting provisions would
remove judicial oversight of corporate law, potentially weakening investor
confidence over time.54 Supporters countered these arguments by
pointing out that intra-corporate litigation had over-expanded under the
current incentive system and, on balance, resulted in more harm than
See Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 858 (“Anticipating such a result, over fifty Delaware
corporations adopted fee-shifting bylaws by April 2015.”).

50

See Lisa A. Rickard, Delaware Flirts With Encouraging Shareholder Lawsuits, WALL ST. J.,.
Nov. 14, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/lisa-rickard-delaware-flirts-withencouraging-shareholder-lawsuits-1416005328 (“Loud protests from national, state and
local business groups, as well as individual companies caused the legislature to rethink
its approach.”).

51

Cf. Jonathan R. Macey, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65
TEX. L. REV. 469, 472 (1987) (“the rules that Delaware supplies often can be viewed as
attempts to maximize revenues to the bar, and more particularly to an elite cadre of
Wilmington lawyers who practice corporate law in the state.”).

52

See CORP. LAW COUNCIL, EXPLANATION OF COUNCIL LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL 4
(2015) [hereinafter COUNCIL EXPLANATION],
http://www.corporatedefensedisputes.com/files/2015/03/COUNCIL-SECONDPROPOSAL-EXPLANATORY-PAPER-3-6-15-U0124513.pdf (finding that faced with
fee-shifting provisions “few stockholders will rationally be able to accept the risk of
exposure to millions of dollars in attorneys’ fees to attempt to rectify a perceived
corporate wrong, no matter how egregious”).

53

Id. at 6 (“If investors were to perceive over time that statutory rights and fiduciary
obligation had become hollow concepts, investors’ confidence could diminish, and
capital formation could be adversely affected”).

54
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good to shareholders. Supporters conceded that even if fee-shifting
provisions might deter some potentially successful suits, the net result
would improve shareholder welfare. On balance, it might be better to
allow some risk of bad behavior than to perpetuate a system that
consumes corporate resources in endless disputes.
Ultimately, the faction opposing fee-shifting provisions prevailed,
and the Delaware legislature banned fee-shifting provisions.55 In the
aftermath, many corporate managers expressed dissatisfaction with the
legislation and Delaware’s failure to reign in excessive litigation.56
C. Oklahoma’s Amendment
While Delaware debated fee-shifting provisions, Oklahoma
moved swiftly to change its corporate law to make fee-shifting mandatory
for all derivative disputes.57 Oklahoma’s statute is notable because it
changed the law for Oklahoma corporations instead of simply authorizing
Oklahoma corporations to adopt fee-shifting provisions if they deemed
them appropriate.
D. Nevada’s Opportunity
Although Oklahoma already explicitly embraced fee-shifting,
other states now face a choice between three options: (i) some form of
legislative adoption and authorization; (ii) inaction pushing the issue onto
courts; or (iii) following Delaware and banning these provisions.
55

See generally 2015 Delaware S.B. 75.

56 Liz Hoffman, Dole and Other Companies Sour on Delaware as Corporate Haven, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 2, 2015, https://www.wsj.com/articles/dole-and-other-companies-sour-ondelaware-as-corporate-haven-1438569507 (“Executives of Dole, DuPont Co.,
Ancestry.com Inc. and other Delaware companies have publicly and privately appealed
to state officials to find ways to curb lawsuits.”). Notably, the legislation banning feeshifting provisions also authorized corporations to make Delaware the exclusive forum
for resolving any internal corporate claims. From an interest-group analysis perspective,
this might be viewed as an effort to secure additional fees for Delaware lawyers. See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (West) (“The certificate of incorporation or the bylaws may
require . . . that any or all internal corporate claims shall be brought solely and exclusively
in any or all of the courts in this State”).
57 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1126 (West) (“In any derivative action instituted by a
shareholder of a domestic or foreign corporation, the court having jurisdiction, upon
final judgment, shall require the nonprevailing party or parties to pay the prevailing party
or parties the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, taxable as costs, incurred as
a result of such action”).
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Nevada may be well situated to continue differentiating itself
from Delaware in the market for corporate incorporations.58 Nevada now
ranks a distant second behind Delaware in attracting public company
corporate charters.59 Nevada’s success may be attributed to changes in its
corporate law designed to reduce managerial liability.60 Firms concerned
about the high governance costs associated with derivative litigation might
prefer to reincorporate into Nevada to take shelter under Nevada’s
protections. Moreover, Nevada has attracted attention as a jurisdiction
that might compete with Delaware.61
Nevada has steadily embraced a strategy to “differentiate itself
from Delaware by providing its corporations with minimal liability
exposure.”62 Nevada’s distinct approach has even been marketed by its
Secretary of State.63 Thus far, the effort has had some success at attracting
corporate charters. Some firms openly declare that they selected Nevada
law because of the liability environment. For example, one firm released
a proxy statement advocating for a change to Nevada because
“reincorporation in Nevada may help us attract and retain qualified
management by reducing the risk of lawsuits being filed against the
Company and its directors.”64
Current research about the impact of Nevada law on shareholder

See LoPucki, supra note 4, at 2126 (“At present, Nevada, Maryland, Oklahoma,
Connecticut, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming are either actively competing
or preparing to do so.”).

58

59

Id. at 2112.

Michal Barzuza, Market Segmentation: The Rise of Nevada as a Liability-Free Jurisdiction, 98
VA. L. REV. 935, 940 (2012) (“Nevada has capitalized on this opportunity by offering,
and aggressively marketing, a unique product--a no-liability corporate law--that has
proven attractive to a subset of American companies.”).

60

See generally Kevin LaCroix, Should Nevada Be the New Preferred Forum? (That’s Right,
Nevada.), THE D&O DIARY, Aug. 12, 2015, https://www.dandodiary.com/2015/08/
articles/corporate-governance/should-nevada-be-the-new-preferred-forum-thats-rightnevada/.

61

Michal Barzuza, Inefficient Tailoring: The Private Ordering Paradox in Corporate Law, 8 HARV.
BUS. L. REV. 131, 168–69 (2018).

62

Id. (“Nevada has been marketing its services by highlighting the greater protections
afforded to managers, directors and officers under Nevada law.”).

63

Cleantech Solutions International, Inc., Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, May 22, 2012, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/819926/000121390012002971/def14a0512_cleantech.htm.

64
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value paints an inconclusive picture.65 Many of Nevada’s public
companies trade only over-the-counter (OTC), making it difficult to
acquire clear stock price information.66 Adding to the difficulty,
reincorporation from Delaware to Nevada occurs infrequently. One
reincorporation event study examining a single firm did not find any
significant evidence that shareholders cared one way or another about a
decision to reincorporate to Nevada.67
Although not definitive, some evidence tends to show that
Nevada’s approach might be right for some firms. One recent study,
forthcoming in the Journal of Law & Economics, found no evidence that
Nevada’s corporate law harms shareholders.68 Rather, it found that
evidence suggested “that Nevada’s pro-managerial system is conducive to
the value of the firms that choose to incorporate in Nevada.”69 The
evidence supports the view that “strong shareholder monitoring and
stringent fiduciary norms are not necessarily conducive to shareholder
welfare.”70
III.

PROVISIONAL GOVERNANCE PACKAGES

A provisional, limited approach may help states decide how to
proceed. Importantly, shifting stock market prices for public companies
provide information.71 Reasonably efficient securities markets swiftly
65 See Barzuza, supra note 62, at 173 (“Despite what one might expect given Nevada firms’
high ratios of reporting irregularities, our study did not find conclusive evidence that
firms in Nevada were traded in a lower value relative to firms in other states”).
66 Id. at 174 (“Nevada firms come disproportionally from OTC, which provides only thin
trading data”).
67 Bruce H. Kobayashi, Larry E. Ribstein, Nevada and the Market for Corporate Law, 35
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1165, 1186 (2012) (“We could not reject the null hypothesis that
shareholders were unaffected by the decision to reincorporate, as there is no evidence
of statistically significant negative or positive abnormal returns generated by the
announcement of the firm’s decision to reincorporate under Nevada law.”).
68 Ofer Eldar, Can Lax Corporate Law Increase Shareholder Value? Evidence from Nevada, 62
J. OF L. & ECON. (forthcoming 2019) (on file with author).
69

Id.

70

Id.

See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1543 (2007) (“stock prices
have become more informative[,] . . . .individual stock price movements . . . became
increasingly decoupled from overall market movements, meaning that firm-specific
71
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react to new public information and impound that information into a
stock’s price. If shareholders, on balance, believe that a change will harm
the corporation in the long run, many may opt to sell their shares, driving
the price down. In contrast, news reflecting a higher probability of a more
prosperous future causes prices to increase as more investors purchase the
stock.
Although imperfect markets do not provide perfect predictions,
event studies focused on market reactions can provide useful information
about how investors view particular changes.72 This part sketches a rough
outline for how a state legislature might deliberately craft its corporate law
to facilitate using event studies to evaluate market reactions to new laws.
A. Clearing Away Confounding Factors
Event studies often suffer from imprecision when confounding
factors make it difficult to assess an event or statement’s impact.73 This
often happens when a company releases more than one piece of
information at a time. An event study may be able to see the market
reacting to new information in the aggregate, not whether a particular
piece of information drove the change.74 Consider a stock price reacting
in the wake of a corporation announcing two facts at the same time: (i)
corporate earnings significantly exceeded analyst expectations for the
quarter; and (ii) a promising and previously-hyped research initiative had
failed. If the stock moves upward after the corporation makes both
announcements, disentangling the impact each statement had on the stock
factors became increasingly influential. This greater firm-specific return variation is best
explained, in the United States, in terms of increasingly informative stock prices.”).
For a description of an event study, see Jill E. Fisch et. al., The Logic and Limits of Event
Studies in Securities Fraud Litigation, 96 TEX. L. REV. 553, 570 (2018) (“In its simplest form,
an event study compares a stock’s return on a day when news of interest hits the market
to the range of returns typically observed for that stock, taking account of what would
have been expected given general changes in the overall market on that day.”).

72

Alon Brav & J.B. Heaton, Event Studies in Securities Litigation: Low Power, Confounding
Effects, and Bias, 93 WASH. U.L. REV. 583, 605 (2015) (“Causes of price impacts unrelated
to the event under study are ‘“confounding effects.’” “Sometimes confounding effects
are apparent, such as when, in an event study of dividend omissions, a firm
simultaneously announces bad earnings, which makes it more difficult to determine how
much of the observed price impact resulted from the dividend omission and how much
from the negative earnings announcement”) (citation omitted).

73

See Fisch, et al., supra note 72, at 614 (“When multiple sources of news are released at
exactly the same time, however, no event study can by itself separate out the effects of
the different news. The event study can only tell us whether the net effect of all the news
was associated with an unusually large price drop or rise.”).

74
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price may be impossible.
Carefully structured corporate enabling statutes may be able to
clear away some confounding factors. States could reduce confounding
factors by requiring corporations enacting new governance provisions to
announce these changes individually instead of lumping them together
with other pieces of news that might also impact the corporation’s stock
price.75 Although efficient markets quickly incorporate new information,
the effect is not instantaneous. To create a buffer around the release, a
state might require announcements to occur midweek, during trading
hours, and when no information had been announced for two days before.
A well-crafted enabling statute might also require that the corporation
certify it has no intention of making additional announcements that
week.76
This type of announcement protocol would facilitate efforts to
evaluate governance announcements. Although it might be difficult to
definitively assess how the market reacts after a single firm announces a
change through this type of procedure, multi-firm event studies allow
researchers to speak with much greater confidence about a governance
rule’s impact.77 As more firms announce through this type of process,
observers gain an incrementally stronger sense about a provision’s impact.
B. Testing Consistent Packages
Effective evaluation of any provisional rule may require trimming
away some of the traditional freedom offered by corporate law. In most
instances, corporate law serves to enable, allowing lawyers to decide how
to draft particular provisions or whether to copy language used elsewhere.
This may result in corporations using different words to accomplish
roughly the same results. In some instances, the different wording may
matter because a reviewing court may see distinctions between differently
worded provisions.

Because of mandatory disclosure rules under the federal securities laws, this might
require special board meetings where the issue could be resolved alone.
75

76 Of course, events might require some corporate announcement during that week and
a state could not prohibit a public company from complying with federal law.
77 Brav & Heaton, supra note 73, at 586 (“[A]lmost all academic research event studies
are multi-firm event studies (MFESs) that examine large samples of securities from
multiple firms.”) (citation omitted).
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Significant drafting freedom may also introduce additional
confounding factors into any attempt to evaluate the impact of
controversial corporate provisions. Markets may react differently to
differently drafted provisions out of a belief that courts would interpret
them differently or that the provisions might impose different obligations.
Conditioning access to provisional governance rules on the
adoption of a uniform package of terms would reduce many of these
concerns.78 As others have noted, legislatures might also allow firms to
simply opt-in to particular types of provisions instead of enabling them
to craft their own.79 Enabling packages of legislatively-crafted terms
would reduce uncertainty and allow the legislature greater freedom in
experimenting.
C. Sunset Provisions
Legislative bodies do not always function smoothly. There is
always the risk that experimental provisions might remain law
indefinitely—even if they produce pernicious effects. Future legislatures
might have entirely different agendas to pursue and little interest in
reviewing the outcome of an experiment.
Sunset provisions may serve to mitigate some of these risks.80
The provisions specify that a particular law will go out of effect in the
future unless the legislature affirmatively renews it.81 With a sunset
provision in place, a future legislature would have to decide that the
experiment had been a success and opt to authorize the provisions on a
permanent basis.
Of course, including sunset provisions may increase risks for
corporate entities. A corporation may hesitate to incur the cost and
Cf. Barzuza, supra note 62, at 179 (“findings also lend support to a novel policy
approach: creating a menu of minimal governance packages for firms to choose from.
For example, if a firm chooses to incorporate in Nevada it should also have to adopt
both proxy access and majority voting to ensure board accountability. So, a Nevada
package will include a proxy access and a majority voting term.”).

78

See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L.
REV. 757, 840–41 (1995) (“This suggestion is not as radical or difficult to apply as it may
appear. State legislatures would enact the menus just as they now enact default rules.
They would be written to attract groups of firms with identifiable contractual needs, just
as default rules are to be designed for the majority of firms”).

79

See SUNSET LAW, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (“A statute under which a
governmental agency or program automatically terminates at the end of a fixed period
unless it is formally renewed”).

80

81

Id.
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expense associated with reincorporation or adoption if the benefits would
be available only fleetingly.
A decade might provide a reasonable amount of time to test a
new corporate law package. The enabling legislation must allow enough
time for the governance package to be thoroughly vetted. It would allow
corporations to opt in to the experimental corporate package over time
and time for the markets to learn how to evaluate these provisions. Much
of that learning might only occur after slow-moving courts interpret the
new provisions.
Importantly, sunset provisions only provide for an automatic end
at a specific point in the future. They do not require a legislature to
continue an experiment past the point where results become obvious. If
a governance package proves to be value-destroying or otherwise unwise,
the legislature could simply rescind its authorization for the package.
D. Funding Review
Corporate law also provides an ideal landscape for this sort of
provisional authorization because corporate fees may be used to pay the
costs associated with the process. In creating a provisional governance
package, a state legislature might simply condition corporate adoption of
particular provisions on the payment of specific, additional fees. These
fees could be used for general state revenues, education, or for funding
studies to review the impact of new governance provisions.
The market might react positively to experimental packages tied
to funding provisions. These provisions would signal state commitment
to optimizing corporate law and the development of useful information.
They would also mitigate the fear that fee-shifting or other provisions
might be enacted by a state eager to race to the bottom to maximize its
own revenue.
In any event, modest additional fees would not be a sticking point
for corporate actors. Corporations concerned about high governance
costs would likely gladly pay an additional annual fee to participate. In
many instances, a general counsel would enthusiastically recommend that
a corporation pay an extra $10,000 a year if it reduced the risk of paying
millions in defense costs to defend against derivative litigation.
E. Considerations for Framing A Fee-Shifting Package
Fee-shifting provisions provide a novel opportunity for some
provisional authorization. Despite Delaware’s ban, fee-shifting provisions
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also provide a reasonable response to excessive litigation. The provisions
have a long history of use in the bond market which provides an
analogous situation for two reasons: “(1) that both are investors to a
corporation and (2) that dispersed ownership often leads to similar
collective action problems.”82
Not all fee-shifting provisions are alike. For example, the federal
Trust Indenture Act explicitly authorizes fee-shifting at the discretion of
the court.83 In explaining the basis for authorizing fee-shifting, then SEC
Commissioner, William O. Douglas, stated that the provision served “so
as not to make too profitable just plain, ordinary strike suits, where suits
are brought by irresponsible people merely in order to get a little money
[through early settlement] from the trustees.”84 Other contracts impose
different terms. For example, the American Bar Association’s Model
Stock Purchase Agreement makes fee shifting mandatory and symmetric:
10.12. ATTORNEYS’ FEES[.] In the event any
Proceeding is brought in respect of this Agreement or any
of the documents referred to in this Agreement, the
prevailing party will be entitled to recover reasonable
attorneys' fees and other costs incurred in such
Proceeding, in addition to any relief to which such party
may be entitled. 85
The symmetrical approach embraced by the ABA’s Model Stock
Purchase Agreement differs from the approach initially pursued by
Delaware corporations.86 For example, Echo Therapeutics adopted a
broad fee-shifting bylaw that would push costs and fees onto plaintiffs
whenever they achieved only a partial victory:87
82

Albert H. Choi, Fee-Shifting and Shareholder Litigation, 104 VA. L. REV. 59, 98 (2018).

83

15 U.S.C.A. § 77ooo(e) (West).

Regulation of Sale of Securities: Hearing on S. 2344 Before the Subcomm. on Sec. &
Exch. of the S. Comm. on Banking & Currency, 75th Cong. 69 (1937) (statement of
William O. Douglas, Comm’r, Securities & Exchange Commission).

84

85

Model Stock Purchase Agreement, § 12.15 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2010).

See Choi, supra note 82, at 97-98 (“Under the ATP Tour bylaws, by contrast, when the
plaintiff ‘does not obtain a judgment on the merits that substantially achieves, in
substance and amount, the full remedy sought, the plaintiff will still have to reimburse
the defendant’s litigation expenses.”) (citation omitted).

86

Id. at 71 (explaining that with the Echo Therapeutics bylaw, “fee-shifting applies in
only one direction, from the defendant to the plaintiff, and even when the plaintiff
achieves a partial victory. The provision shifts the defendant’s litigation expenses to the
plaintiff when the plaintiff ‘does not obtain a judgment on the merits that substantially

87
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5.13. Litigation Costs. To the fullest extent permitted by
law, in the event that (i) any current or prior stockholder
or anyone on their behalf (“Claiming Party”) initiates or
asserts any claim or counterclaim (“Claim”) or joins,
offers substantial assistance to, or has a direct financial
interest in any Claim against the Corporation and/or any
Director, Officer, Employee or Affiliate, and (ii) the
Claiming Party (or the third party that received substantial
assistance from the Claiming Party or in whose Claim the
Claiming Party had a direct financial interest) does not
obtain a judgment on the merits that substantially
achieves, in substance and amount, the full remedy sought,
then each Claiming Party shall be obligated jointly and
severally to reimburse the Corporation and any such
Director, Officer, Employee or Affiliate, the greatest
amount permitted by law of all fees, costs and expenses
of every kind and description (including but not limited
to, all reasonable attorney's fees and other litigation
expenses) (collectively, “Litigation Costs”) that the parties
may incur in connection with such Claim.88
This type of broad bylaw drew substantial criticism as potentially
overreaching because it seemingly covers both derivative and direct
litigation. Derivative claims are claims that return money to the
corporation—with the fees for plaintiffs’ attorneys determined by the
court.89 In contrast, direct claims return funds directly to shareholders
and a plaintiff attorney’s recovery will ordinarily be governed by
contract.90 Before Delaware banned fee-shifting provisions, one
Chancery Court jurist hinted that he would likely rule that these bylaw

achieves . . . the full remedy sought.”).
88 Echo Therapeutics, Inc., Amended and Restated By-Laws of Echo Therapeutics, Inc.
9 (July 24, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1031927/0001415889140
02261/ex3-2.htm.
89 See Choi, supra note 82, at 71 (“In a derivative lawsuit, if there is any monetary recovery,
the recovery will go to the corporation (and not to the plaintiff-shareholders); perhaps
more importantly, the amount of expenses that the plaintiffs’ attorneys can recover will
be determined by the court”).
90

Id.

956

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 20

provisions could not reach direct claims.91
Putting precise linguistic framing to the side, legislatively
authorizing a form of symmetrical fee-shifting for intracorporate
litigation would likely provide significant benefits. Fee-shifting provisions
would force plaintiffs’ attorneys to consider the costs as well as their
potential gains, driving them toward more judicious decisions about when
to sue.92 In the aggregate, this type of provision might reduce governance
costs for corporations with these bylaws.
Legislative authorization for fee-shifting allows the legislature to
control the scope and severity of these provisions. A state with a wellfunctioning business court might opt to make fee-shifting discretionary at
the option of the trial court. A state concerned about maximizing
deterrence and minimizing governance costs might opt to make feeshifting mandatory.
F. Inaction as a Policy Alternative
Importantly, legislative inaction does mean that corporations
chartered in states other than Delaware will not successfully enact feeshifting bylaws and charter provisions anyway. Consider Nevada for an
example. There are now at least seven different Nevada-registered public
corporations with fee-shifting provisions.93
Substantial uncertainty remains about these provisions. For
example, although these provisions have not yet been evaluated by
Nevada courts, a Nevada court might follow ATP Tour’s reasoning and
uphold the provisions. This result would likely attract substantial publicity
and lead other corporations to adopt similar provisions. As adoption
expands, the opportunity to structure how corporations enact these
provisions to foster better observations might pass. It might also become
See In re Activision Blizzard, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, C.A. No. 8885-VCL, at 50
(May 20, 2015), https://courts.delaware.gov/opinions/download.aspx?ID=223710 (“A
Rule 10b-5 claim under the federal securities laws is a personal claim akin to a tort claim
for fraud. The right to bring a Rule 10b-5 claim is not a property right associated with
shares, nor can it be invoked by those who simply hold shares of stock.”).

91

See Choi, supra note 82, at 111 (“Th[is] Article has argued that a more even-handed,
symmetric fee-shifting provision can lead to better screening of meritorious lawsuits
from frivolous ones . . . .”).

92

See, e.g., 10-K | EX-3.2, Lone Star Gold, Inc., CIK 0001464865, 000-54509, May 25,
2018, 5 page(s), Art. X (“In the event that any shareholder initiates or asserts a claim
against the Corporation . . . and the shareholder does not obtain . . . the full remedy
sought, then such shareholder shall be obligated . . . to reimburse the Corporation . . .
for all fees, costs and expenses of every kind and description . . . .”).

93

2019]

CRAFTING FEE-SHIFTING POLICY

957

increasingly difficult to enact limitations on fee-shifting provisions as
more firms adopt the provisions and devote resources to defending the
provisions.
CONCLUSION
States now face a range of choices between following Delaware
and banning fee-shifting provisions, adopting an intermediate approach
to cautiously test the provisions as outlined in this essay, and doing
nothing. This essay makes the case for the intermediate approach and
recognizes that fee-shifting provides an opportunity for thoughtful
competition with Delaware.
Explicit legislative involvement offers real benefits. For corporate
actors, legislative authorization would substantially reduce uncertainty
about whether fee-shifting provisions would be enforceable. Diminished
uncertainty would also make the provisions more effective at deterring
strike suits and other extraordinarily low-probability litigation. For
shareholder advocates concerned about preserving shareholder rights,
legislative authorization provides a way to moderate the provisions
enacted.
Importantly, the market-harnessing suggestions outlined here
provide a framework for assessing fee-shifting’s impact in the future.
These provisions will remain controversial. A process that generates
evidence showing that the provisions harm shareholders will likely check
their expansion. On the other hand, if the provisions reduce governance
costs without any significant ill effects, they will provide a valuable
mechanism for checking excessive litigation.

